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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) can be easily fooled by
adding human imperceptible perturbations to the images.
These perturbed images are known as ‘adversarial exam-
ples’ and pose a serious threat to security and safety critical
systems. A litmus test for the strength of adversarial exam-
ples is their transferability across different DNN models in
a black box setting (i.e. when the target model’s architecture
and parameters are not known to attacker).
Current attack algorithms that seek to enhance adversar-
ial transferability work on the decision level i.e. generate
perturbations that alter the network decisions. This leads
to two key limitations: (a) An attack is dependent on the
task-specific loss function (e.g. softmax cross-entropy for
object recognition) and therefore does not generalize be-
yond its original task. (b) The adversarial examples are
specific to the network architecture and demonstrate poor
transferability to other network architectures.
We propose a novel approach to create adversarial ex-
amples that can broadly fool different networks on multi-
ple tasks. Our approach is based on the following intu-
ition: “Perpetual metrics based on neural network features
are highly generalizable and show excellent performance
in measuring and stabilizing input distortions. Therefore
an ideal attack that creates maximum distortions in the net-
work feature space should realize highly transferable ex-
amples”. We report extensive experiments to show how ad-
versarial examples generalize across multiple networks for
classification, object detection and segmentation tasks.
1. Introduction
Transferability is a phenomenon where adversarial ex-
amples created for one network can fool others. The trans-
ferability of adversarial examples makes it challenging to
deploy deep neural networks in security critical environ-
ments. This is of high concern because it gives attackers
the flexibility to train a local network and transfer its at-
tack against an already deployed network, without knowing
its architecture or parameters (‘black-box attacks’). Current
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Figure 1: Similar to off-the-shelf deep features that are em-
ployed to boost the performance of different computer vi-
sion tasks, adversarial noise patterns found in deep features
space are transferable across different tasks. (Noise pattern
is magnified for better visualization)
attack algorithms [8, 5] perform well when the network ar-
chitecture and parameters are known (‘white-box setting’);
however, their strength significantly decreases in the black
box setting, as shown in [21]. Recent attempts on enhancing
the transferability in black-box settings have been reported
in [6, 26, 27]. Nevertheless, their dependency on a task-
specific loss function make them non-transferable across
different tasks. For example, to fool classification models,
the attacker starts from the softmax cross-entropy to find a
gradient direction that increases the model loss for a given
sample. Examples found in this way are specific and do not
generalize beyond their original task.
We propose a novel approach to generate high strength
adversarial examples that are transferable across different
network architectures and, most importantly, across differ-
ent vision tasks (e.g., image segmentation, classification and
object detection). Our approach is based on the following
intuitions: (a) neural networks trained on ImageNet [18] (or
other sufficiently large image datasets) learn generic inter-
nal representations that are transferable to new tasks and
datasets [10, 19]. As a result, it is common practice to
use pre-trained classification networks as the basic build-
ing block (network backbone) for a variety of different tasks
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[13, 15] and, (b) a perceptual metric based on VGG internal
representations aligns well with human perception [?] and
can be used not only to measure the input distortion but also
to stabilize it [11]. We hypothesize that adversarial exam-
ples based on perceptual distortion, under a given bound,
e.g. l∞ ≤ , in the deep features space, are ideally suited to
fool any deep network, whether designed for classification,
object detection, segmentation or other vision tasks. We
present the first such algorithm, which creates adversarial
examples by distorting the deep neural activations. This not
only generates high-strength perturbations but also provides
flexibility to work with any task, as the proposed attack does
not use any task-dependent loss function.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest to our approach
is a decision-boundary free attack (called FFF) [17]. The
idea is to train a single perturbation within a given met-
ric norm to maximize the activation response of the net-
work’s internal layers. After training, the perturbation is
added to the input images to make them adversarial. The
problem with this approach is that it optimizes adversarial
noise in a way that is independent of the data sample; hence
noise, severely overfits the network and has very low trans-
ferability. In contrast, we do not optimize a single noise
pattern, instead we directly maximize the distortions in the
network’s internal representations for a given input sample.
Zhou et al. [27] also proposed to maximize representation
loss. However, their approach is specific to only the classi-
fication task, since the gradient direction in their approach
is dependent on cross-entropy loss, which requires labels
for the task at hand. Thus, their attack algorithm is essen-
tially a supervised adversarial attack. In contrast, we don’t
use any task dependent loss in our objective, so our attack
method does not rely on any labels. Thus, it is an unsuper-
vised adversarial attack. Furthermore, we focus on VGG
networks for high-dimensional datasets. Remarkably, other
networks (Inception/Resnet) do not offer enough distortion
in a constrained optimization scenario to carry out this type
of attack.
One intriguing aspect of our approach is its simplicity
and efficiency. For instance, we only use features from a
single layer (conv3.3) of VGG-16 [20] (instead of multiple
layers as in [17]) and calculate the mean squared difference
between the original and adversarial examples to represent
neural representation distortion (NRD). NRD is fully differ-
entiable and its minimization can help in image restoration
problems [11]. Here, we propose to maximize the NRD to
construct adversarial examples. Finding adversarial exam-
ples based on feature representation makes our attack gen-
eralizable across different architectures for different tasks.
Specifically, we show high inter-task and intra-task trans-
ferability for our approach on large-scale datasets, including
ImageNet [18], MS-COCO [14] and CAMVID [4].
Our method is not restricted to the original backbone
models trained on a specific benchmark. Most backbone
models are fine-tuned with additional training datasets to a
specific task. As we elaborate in Sec. 6, our method can
successfully be applied to any network that is pretrained on
one benchmark, then fine-tuned on another, e.g. RetinaNet
[13] and SegNet [3].
Contributions: We study and highlight the importance
of a neural network’s internal representations (Fig. 1) in the
context of adversarial attacks. Our major contributions are:
• We propose a generalizable, black-box, untargeted ad-
versarial attack algorithm on a neural network’s inter-
nal representation.
• We leverage generic representations learned by mod-
els (e.g. VGG-16 [20]) trained on large image datasets
(e.g. ImageNet [18]) to construct transferable adver-
sarial examples.
• Our attack algorithm does not rely on a task-specific
loss function or a specific set of input labels, there-
fore it demonstrates cross-network, cross-dataset, and
cross-task transferability.
• We provide state-of-the-art results for classification
networks and provide a robust benchmark to measure
the robustness of any neural network based vision sys-
tem against generic adversarial examples.
2. Related Work
Since the seminal work of Szegedy et al. [24] many ad-
versarial attack algorithms [7, 8, 2, 6] have been proposed
to show the vulnerability of neural networks against im-
perceptible changes to inputs. A single-step attack, called
fast gradient sign method (FGSM), was proposed by [7].
In a follow-up work, Kurakin et al. [8] proposed a robust
multi-step attack, called iterative fast gradient sign meth-
ods (I-FGSM) that iteratively searches the loss surface of
a network under a given metric norm. To improve trans-
ferability, a variant of I-FGSM, called momentum iterative
fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM), was introduced [6],
which significantly enhances the transferability of untar-
geted attacks on ImageNet [18] under a perturbation bud-
get of l∞ ≤ 16. Authors [6] associated the transferability
of MI-FGSM with its ability to break local maxima as the
number of attack iterations increase. Recently, [26] pro-
posed a data augmentation technique to further boost the
transferability of these attack methods. In contrast to ours,
all of these methods are supervised adversarial attacks de-
pendent on cross-entropy loss to find the harmful gradient
direction.
Interestingly, NRD of I-FGSM decreases as the number
of attack iterations increases as compared to MI-FGSM as
shown in Fig. 2. We generate adversarial examples on Ima-
geNet [18] subset provided by the NIPS security challenge
2017. As can be seen, MI-FGSM maintains its NRD with
increasing number of iterations. This also indicates that di-
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Figure 2: Accuracy of Inc-v4 and NRD is shown for adver-
sarial examples generated on Inc-v3 by I-FGSM and MI-
FGSM. NRD is averaged over all examples. As the number
of iterations increases, the accuracy of Inc-v4 on adversarial
example found by I-FGSM increases, i.e., the transferability
of I-FGSM decreases along with its NRD.
rectly maximizing the NRD can boost the transferability of
adversarial examples.
3. Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we first provide our problem setting, fol-
lowed by a brief background to adversarial attacks. We ex-
plain how popular attack mechanisms, such as FGSM [7],
I-FGSM [8] and MI-FGSM [6], differ from each other. This
background will form the basis of our proposed attack in
Sec. 4.
Problem Setting: In this paper, we specifically consider
the transferability of untargeted attacks under the l∞ norm
constraint on perturbation strength. Untargeted attacks are
considered because they have higher transferability com-
pared to targeted attacks [6, 26]. Furthermore, to make sure
that the benign and adversarial examples are close to each
other, an attacker is constrained under a metric norm like
l∞ ≤ , i.e., in the case of images the attacker can change
each pixel intensity value by at maximum  amount.
3.1. FGSM
Adversarial examples can be formulated as a constrained
optimization problem. Suppose we are given a classifier
function F that maps an input x to its ground-truth class
y, a cost function J(x, y) that is used to train the classifier
and an allowed perturbation budget ‘’. FGSM [7] finds an
adversarial example x′ that satisfies ‖ x′ − x ‖∞≤  using
the following formulation:
x′ = x+  · sign(∇xJ(x, y)), (1)
where∇xJ(x, y) represent the gradient of the cost function
w.r.t input x. A common choice for J is the cross-entropy
loss. The problem with FGSM is that it is a single-step
attack, which reduces the attack success rate due to under-
fitting the threat model. To overcome this difficulty, an iter-
ative version of FGSM was proposed [8].
3.2. I-FGSM
I-FGSM [8] iteratively applies FGSM with a small step
size α for a given number of iterations T . The step size α
can be calculated by dividing the perturbation budget  with
the number of iterations T , i.e., α = /T . I-FGSM can be
represented as follows for steps t ∈ [1, T ]:
x′0 = x, x
′
t+1 = x
′
t + α · sign(∇xJ(x′t, y)). (2)
The problem with I-FGSM is that it overfits the threat
model, reducing model accuracy to even 0%, while pro-
ducing a small neural representation distortion (NRD) (See
Fig. 2 for empirical evidence). One side effect of having
low NRD is the reduced transferability of adversarial exam-
ples. This is what Dong et al. [6] built upon, proposing an
attack algorithm that finds adversarial examples iteratively,
while maintaining the transferability rate.
3.3. MI-FGSM
The work in [6] added momentum into the optimization
objective of I-FGSM. It can be expressed as follows:
x′0 =x, x
′
t+1 = x
′
t + α · sign(gt+1), t ∈ [1, T ]
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ(x
′
t, y)
‖∇xJ(x′t, y)‖1
. (3)
The strength of MI-FGSM can be described by two of its
control parameters, number of iterations and momentum.
The number of attack iterations makes it strong in white-
box settings (like I-FGSM), while momentum allows it to
maintain NRD, enhancing the attack success rate in black-
box settings.
Based on the above observations, we build our frame-
work and propose to enhance the NRD directly to create
strong adversarial examples for black-box attacks.
4. Neural Representation Distortion
The Problem: Strong white-box attack algorithms [8, 5]
consider already-known network parameters θ and perturb
the input to create x′, such that the example is misclassi-
fied, i.e., F(x′;θ) 6= y. Since the perturbations are calcu-
lated using gradient directions that are specific to θ, the re-
sulting perturbed images x′ do not generalize well to other
networks [6, 21]. The attacks presented in [6, 26, 27] show
relatively better transferability, however, these attacks also
perturb input images along gradient directions∇xJ that are
dependent on the ground-truth label y and the definition
of the loss function J . This dependency limits the cross-
network and cross-task transferability of these attacks.
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Figure 3: VGG-16 output is shown for sample images. (a) represents benign example, while (b), (c), (d) and (e) show
adversarial examples generated by FGSM, MI-FGSM, DIM and NRDM, respectively, against VGG-16 . All adversarial
examples have distance l∞ ≤ 16 from the original seed (a).
Our Solution: In this paper, we propose to directly max-
imize the perceptual metric based on representation loss of
deep feature activations by solving the following optimiza-
tion problem:
max
x′
F(x′)|k −F(x)|k
subject to: ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ , (4)
where F is DNN based classifier, k is the internal represen-
tation layer and  is the allowed perturbation budget. We
apply a transformation T to input x at the first iteration
(Algorithm 1) to create a neural representation difference
of an adversarial w.r.t a benign example and then maximize
the mean squared error of this difference with in a given
perturbation budget. There can be different choices for T
but in this work T simply adds random noise to the input
sample, i.e our algorithm takes a random step at the first it-
eration. Random noise is convenient to attain a difference
at the starting point of our algorithm and it is preferable to
heuristic transformations that may cause methodical bias.
We use the VGG-16 [20] conv3.3 feature map as the neu-
ral representation distortion. This choice is based on ob-
servations, reported in the recent study [21], that adversar-
ial examples found in VGG space have high transferability.
This is also evident in our experimentation (Table 4). In-
creasing the representation loss at multiple network layers
did not notably increase attack success and adds a signifi-
cant computational overhead. Our attack algorithm does not
rely on the cross-entropy loss or input labels. This makes
it a generic algorithm, which can be used to attack any
system using off-the-shelf features in their pipeline. This
makes several popular computer vision tasks vulnerable to
adversarial attacks, e.g., object detection and segmentation.
Furthermore, our proposed approach is complementary to
recent best-performing attack methods, such as MI-FGSM
[6] and DIM [26]. Therefore, we demonstrates that it can
be used alongside them, which further boosts the strength
of adversaries. Our proposed method to maximize NRD for
a given input sample is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Neural Representation Distortion Method
Input: A classifier F , input sample x, input transformation T ,
internal network layer k, perturbation budget  and number of
iterations T .
Output: An adversarial example x′ with ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ .
1: g0 = 0; x′ = x;
2: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
3: if t = 0 then
4: x′ = T (x)
5: end if
6: Forward pass x′t to F and compute L as follows;
L = ‖F(x′)|k −F(x)|k‖2; (5)
7: Compute gradients gt = ∇xL(x′t,x);
8: Apply the following equation;
x′t+1 = x
′
t +  · sign(gt); (6)
9: Project adversary into the vicinity of x
x′t+1 = clip(x
′
t+1, x− , x+ ); (7)
10: end for
11: return x′ = x′T .
5. Experiments
5.1. Evaluation Protocol
In this section, we describe the datasets used for evalua-
tion, network architectures under attack, and the parameter
settings for each attack algorithm.
5.1.1 Datasets
We use the MNIST, and CIFAR10 test sets and the Im-
ageNet [18] subset provided by NIPS security challenge
2017 (ImageNet-NIPS) to validate the effectiveness of the
proposed attack against classification models. The MNIST
and CIFAR10 test sets contain 10k samples each, while
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ImageNet-NIPS contains 1k image samples. For object de-
tection, we used MS-COCO [14] validation set, which con-
tains 40.5k images. This is a multi-task dataset popular for
image segmentation, object detection and image caption-
ing tasks. We report adversarial attack performance against
object detection, however adversarial examples found on
this dataset can be used to fool other related tasks e.g.,
visual question answering. For segmentation, we use the
CAMVID [4] test set to measure segmentation robustness
against NRDM (Algorithm 1). This dataset contains 233
image samples extracted from video sequences of driving
scenes.
model-m model-c
conv2d(32, 3x3) 2∗{conv2d(96, 3x3)}
maxpool(2x2) conv2d(96, 3x3, s=2)
conv2d(64, 3x3) 2∗{conv2d(192, 3x3)}
maxpool(2x2) conv2d(96, 3x3, s=2)
conv2d(64, 3x3) 2∗{conv2d(192, 3x3)}
fc(64) conv2d(10, 3x3)
softmax(10) avg-pool
softmax(10)
Table 1: Architectures of naturally trained convolu-
tional networks for MNIST (model-m) and CIFAR10
(model-c). ‘*’ indicates the number of times a layer is
repeated. ‘s’ represent stride. Each convolutional layer is
followed by ReLU activation. Batch-norm is used after each
convolutional layer in model-c. Layers whose outputs are
used by NRDM are highlighted in bold.
5.1.2 Network Architectures
Classification: We study eight models trained on the Im-
ageNet dataset [18]. These models can be grouped into
two categories. (a) Naturally trained: Five of these mod-
els are only trained on benign examples. These include
Inceptionv3 (Inc-v3) [23], Inceptionv4 (Inc-v4), In-
ception Resnet v2 (IncRes-v2) [22] and Resnet v2-
152 (Res-152) [9] and VGG-19 [20]. (b) Adversarially
trained: The other three, models including Adv-v3 [12],
Inc-v3ens3 and IncRes-v2ens [25], are adversarially
trained and made publicly available. The specific details
about these models can be found in [12, 25]. Attacks are
created for naturally trained models, while tested against all
of them. For classification on smaller datasets, we study
three models each for MNIST and CIFAR10. Among these
models, two are naturally trained and one is adversarially
trained using saddle point optimization [16]. Adversarial
examples are created for naturally trained models, named
model-m and model-c for MNIST and CIFAR10, re-
spectively (see Table 1). These examples are subsequently
transferred to adversarially trained Madry’s models [16]
and naturally trained ResNet models, named res-m and
res-m res-c
conv2d(16, 3x3) conv2d(16, 3x3)
1∗rb
{
conv2d(16, 3x3)
conv2d(16, 3x3)
3∗rb
{
conv2d(16, 3x3)
conv2d(16, 3x3)
1∗rb
{
conv2d(32, 3x3)
conv2d(32, 3x3, s=2)
3∗rb
{
conv2d(32, 3x3)
conv2d(32, 3x3, s=2)
1∗rb
{
conv2d(64, 3x3)
conv2d(64, 3x3, s=2)
3∗rb
{
conv2d(64, 3x3)
conv2d(64, 3x3, s=2)
softmax(10) avg-pool(8x8)
softmax(10)
Table 2: Architectures of naturally trained residual net-
works for MNIST (res-m) and CIFAR10 (res-c). ‘∗’ in-
dicates the number of times a layer is repeated. ‘s’ and ‘rb’
represent stride and residual block respectively. Each con-
volutional layer is followed by a ReLU activation. Batch-
norm is used after each convolutional layer in res-c.
res-c for MNIST and CIFAR10 respectively (see Table
2).
Object Detection: To demonstrate cross-task and
cross-dataset transferability, we study naturally trained
RetinaNet [13] performance against adversarial exam-
ples found by the NRDM approach (Algorithm 1) on the
MS-COCO validation set.
Segmentation: We evaluate the robustness of naturally
trained SegNet-basic [3] against adversarial examples
generated by the NRDM approach (Algorithm 1) on the
CAMVID [4] test set.
5.1.3 Attack Parameters
FGSM is a single-step attack. Its step size is set to 16. In the
case of R-FGSM, we take a step of size α=16/3 in a ran-
dom direction and then a gradient step of size 16−α to max-
imize model loss. The attack methods, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM
and DIM, are run for ten iterations. The step size for these
attacks is set to 1.6, as per standard practice. The momen-
tum decay factor for MI-FGSM is set to one. This means
that attack accumulates all the previous gradient informa-
tion to perform the current update and is shown to have the
best success rate [6]. For DIM, the transformation proba-
bility is set to 0.7. In the case of FFF [17], we train the ad-
versarial noise for 10K iterations to maximize the response
at the activation layers of VGG-16 [20]. For the NRDM
(Algorithm 1), we used the VGG-16 [20] conv3-3 feature
map as the representation loss. Since NRDM maximizes
loss w.r.t a benign example, it does not suffer from the over-
fitting problem. We run NRDM for the maximum number
of 100 iterations. The transferability of different attacks is
compared against the number of iterations in Fig. 4. MI-
FGSM and DIM quickly reach to their full potential within
ten iterations. The strength of I-FGSM strength decreases,
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Accuracy Naturally Trained Adv. Trained
Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 VGG-19 Adv-v3 Inc-v3ens3 IncRes-v2ens
T-1 95.3 97.7 96.1 100.0 85.5 94.3 90.2 96.9
T-5 99.8 99.8 99.9 100.0 96.7 99.4 95.5 99.8
Table 3: Model accuracies are reported on original data set ImageNet-NIPS containing benign examples only. T-1: top-1 and
T-5: top-5 accuracies. Best and second best performances are colorized.
Naturally Trained Adv. Trained
Attack Inc-v3 Inc-v4 Res-152 IncRes-v2 VGG-19 Adv-v3 Inc-v3ens3 IncRes-v2ens
T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5
I
n
c
-
v
3
FGSM [7] 22.0∗ 45.7∗ 62.5 84.7 64.6 85.8 65.9 85.9 49.9 75.7 69.1 88.1 77.2 90.9 90.8 98.3
R-FGSM [25] 16.7∗ 38.0∗ 65.8 86.0 69.5 89.7 68.8 88.7 61.4 83.8 76.4 90.9 77.9 91.2 88.8 97.6
I-FGSM [8] 0.0∗ 1.7∗ 82.0 97.6 86.5 98.6 90.6 99.1 76.7 95.0 88.5 98.7 84.9 94.4 94.6 99.5
MI-FGSM [6] 0.0∗ 1.5∗ 47.1 78.8 47.1 84.5 52.5 81.9 47.3 76.7 71.6 89.8 73.8 90.7 88.3 98.0
TAP [27] 0.0∗ - 22.1 - 46.9 - 24.7 - - - 52.5 - 60.9 - 68.8 -
DIM [26] 0.2∗ 1.3∗ 27.8 63.1 42.1 75.2 34.6 65.4 40.2 71.4 65.2 87.9 68.3 89.6 86.3 97.5
R
e
s
-
1
5
2
FGSM [7] 54.1 79.3 61.2 84.2 16.5∗ 41.0∗ 62.5 85.6 46.0 72.7 67.3 87.4 74.0 89.4 88.4 97.7
R-FGSM [25] 58.5 83.4 64.9 86.6 12.9∗ 35.2∗ 69.1 88.5 56.1 80.8 74.5 90.6 75.5 90.4 86.5 96.5
I-FGSM [8] 80.0 96.6 84.1 98.4 0.9∗ 6.2∗ 92.5 99.1 75.7 94.9 87.4 99.0 85.5 94.8 93.4 99.3
MI-FGSM [6] 43.5 76.8 49.9 79.2 0.9∗ 5.1∗ 54.8 82.4 46.8 76.0 72.6 90.7 71.1 90.1 86.0 97.5
TAP [27] 48.2 - 55.7 - 7.6∗ - 55.2 - - - 49.2 - 57.8 - 64.1 -
DIM [26] 20.1 51.2 22.0 54.6 0.6∗ 4.2∗ 24.6 57.3 33.3 62.6 53.5 82.5 55.2 83.1 74.4 94.1
I
n
c
R
e
s
-
v
2 FGSM [7] 61.7 83.8 69.6 87.6 68.4 89.6 50.1∗ 73.9∗ 52.3 76.5 72.0 89.6 79.0 91.6 90.0 97.7
R-FGSM [25] 66.6 87.0 71.8 89.4 73.5 91.5 46.1∗ 71.3∗ 62.9 84.1 75.5 91.2 79.3 91.5 87.4 97.3
I-FGSM [8] 62.8 88.4 68.3 91.9 77.2 94.8 1.1∗ 2.6∗ 71.4 91.7 85.6 97.5 83.8 95.6 89.8 98.4
MI-FGSM [6] 36.0 67.5 42.4 73.2 49.3 82.2 1.0∗ 2.4∗ 51.3 76.8 70.0 90.1 71.5 92.2 81.8 96.3
TAP [27] 25.9 - 33.2 - 53.5 - 4.8∗ - - - 60.5 - 79.1 - 87.8 -
DIM [26] 21.4 49.8 23.5 53.4 32.3 64.3 4.8∗ 13.7∗ 39.7 69.2 54.9 81.4 57.5 85.9 73.5 94.4
V
G
G
1
6
FGSM [7] 30.1 56.0 34.0 58.0 36.6 65.2 42.2 66.1 9.1 27.9 48.8 72.6 53.5 79.5 72.8 91.1
R-FGSM [25] 41.5 67.9 45.1 72.5 49.2 78.4 54.9 77.7 12.9 35.8 63.9 86.2 63.5 85.3 77.1 93.0
I-FGSM [8] 69.4 93.0 75.3 94.5 79.5 95.7 87.2 97.9 18.3 56.1 82.2 97.5 80.9 93.7 91.5 99.1
MI-FGSM [6] 16.9 42.0 18.7 40.1 24.9 51.6 26.1 52.5 2.0 14.4 38.8 68.1 42.5 72.4 64.2 87.7
TAP [27] 23.9 - 28.1 - 23.9 - 32.3 - - - 38.8 - 41.9 - 63.8 -
DIM [26] 12.9 35.5 15.2 35.8 20.6 45.7 19.7 43.8 0.6 8.8 31.6 59.0 32.1 61.0 56.3 81.0
FFF [17] 61.7 80.7 60.8 78.7 72.8 90.1 76.1 90.1 44.0 68.0 79.6 93.1 83.1 93.1 92.8 98.5
NRDM 5.1 10.2 6.2 12.4 15.6 27.6 13.6 23.0 4.5 14.2 27.7 46.8 54.2 75.4 75.3 89.8
NRDM-DIM 4.9 10.5 5.7 12.0 16.0 28.6 12.7 22.6 5.0 14.0 28.7 45.7 52.9 73.8 74.0 89.5
Table 4: Model accuracies are reported under untargeted l∞ adversarial attacks on ImageNet-NIPS with perturbation budget
l∞ ≤ 16 for pixel space [0-255]. T-1 and T-2 represent top-1 and top-5 accuracies, respectively. NRDM shows higher or
competitive success rates for black-box models than FGSM [7], I-FGSM [8], MI-FGSM [6], TAP [27], DIM [26] and FFF
[17]. NRDM-DIM combines input diversity as well as momentum with NRDM. ‘∗’ indicates the white-box attacks. Best and
second best black-box attacks are colorized.
while NRDM strength increases, with the number of attack
iterations.
5.2. Input Transformations
Different input transformations have been proposed to
mitigate the adversarial effect but they can be easily bro-
ken in a white-box scenario. This is because an attacker
can be adaptive and incorporate transformations into the ad-
versary generation process. Even non-differentiable trans-
formations can be by-passed by approximating them with
an identity function [1]. However in a black-box scenario,
the attacker does not have any knowledge of the transfor-
mation function along with the network architecture and its
parameters. We test the strength of our adversarial attack
against well studied transformations, including JPEG, to-
tal variation minimization (TVM) and median filtering. We
report our experimental results using the above-mentioned
network architectures and input transformations in the fol-
lowing section.
6. Results
Classification: We report the performance of our attack
against a number of CNN architectures on the ImageNet-
NIPS dataset in Table 4. The following insights can be
drawn from our results. (1) In comparison to other state-
of-the-art attacks, our approach consistently demonstrates
a much higher transferability rate for naturally trained im-
ages. Specifically, NRDM attack have much higher trans-
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Figure 4: Accuracy of Inc-v3 for adversarial examples gen-
erated on VGG-16 by I-FGSM and MI-FGSM, DIM and
NRDM. NRDM’s strength increases with number of itera-
tions, in contrast to MI-FGSM and DIM.
Datasets ↓ Attack ↓ Naturally Trained Adv. Trained
model-m res-m Madry-M
MNIST
FGSM 42.28∗ 53.15 95.96
I-FGSM 40.66∗ 51.04 96.64
MI-FGSM 40.66∗ 48.19 95.96
NRDM 4.39∗ 23.54∗ 97.56
model-c res-c Madry-C
CIFAR10
FGSM 5.47∗ 24.19 85.54
I-FGSM 2.52∗ 36.81 87.00
MI-FGSM 2.52∗ 16.56 85.71
NRDM 11.92∗ 23.98 86.99
Table 5: Model accuracies under untargeted l∞ adversarial
attacks on MNIST and CIFAR10 with perturbation budget
l∞ ≤ 76.5 and l∞ ≤ 8, respectively, for pixel space [0-
255], as per standard practice [16]. NRDM shows higher or
competitive success rates for black-box models compared
to FGSM, I-FGSM and MI-FGSM. ‘∗’ indicates the white-
box attacks. Best and second best attacks are colorized.
Dataset ↓ Metric ↓ Naturally Trained Adv. Trained
model-m res-m Madry-M
MNIST Accuracy 99.30 98.88 98.40
model-c res-c Madry-C
CIFAR10 Accuracy 85.44 80.56 87.62
Table 6: Model accuracies on original test datasets for
MNIST and CIFAR10 containing benign examples only.
Best and second best performances are colorized.
ferability on naturally trained models, bringing down top-1
accuracy of IncRes-v2 [22] from 100.0% (see Table 3) to
12.7% (see Table 4). (2) In comparison, MI-FGSM [6] and
DIM [26] perform slightly better on adversarially trained
ensemble models [25], with NRDM showing competitive
success rate. This is because the MI-FGSM and DIM meth-
ods use decision boundary information while, NRDM is
agnostic to decision-level information about the classifier.
Method No Attack NRDM
l∞ ≤ 8 l∞ ≤ 16
No Defense 79.70 52.48 32.59
JPEG (quality=75) 77.25 51.76 32.44
JPEG (quality=50) 75.27 52.45 33.16
JPEG (quality=20) 68.82 53.08 35.54
TVM (weights=30) 73.70 55.54 34.21
TVM (weights=10) 70.38 59.52 34.57
MF (window=3) 75.65 49.18 30.52
Table 7: Segnet-Basic accuracies on CAMVID test set with
and without input transformations against NRDM. Best and
second best performances are colorized.
Method No Attack NRDM
l∞ ≤ 8 l∞ ≤ 16
No Defense 53.78 22.75 5.16
JPEG (quality=75) 49.57 20.73 4.7
JPEG (quality=50) 46.36 19.89 4.33
JPEG (quality=20) 40.04 19.13 4.58
TVM (weights=30) 47.06 27.63 6.36
TVM (weights=10) 42.79 32.21 9.56
MF (window=3) 43.48 19.59 5.05
Table 8: mAP (with IoU = 0.5) of RetinaNet is reported on
the MS-COCO validation set with and without input trans-
formations against NRDM. Best and second best perfor-
mances are colorized.
(3) We also test with adversarial examples found using
different network architectures (i.e., Inc-v3, Res-152,
IncRes-v2, VGG16). Overall, we conclude that the ad-
versarial examples found in VGG-16 [20] space have very
high transferability. Figure 3 shows a visual comparison
of adversaries found by different attack algorithms. On
small datasets (MNIST and CIFAR10), similar to other at-
tacks, the NRDM becomes ineffective against adversarially
trained Madry models [16] (see Tables 6 and 5) in black-
box settings. This shows that finding better methods for ad-
versarial training is a way forward to defend against these
attacks. Input transformations can somewhat help to miti-
gate the adversarial effect in black-box settings (see Table
9). TVM is the most effective against all the attacks, while
median filtering perform better against DIM [26]. JPEG is
the least effective against untargeted adversarial attacks.
Segmentation: The NRDM attack created on CAMVID
[4] in VGG-16 feature space is able to bring down the per
pixel accuracy of Segnet-Basic by 47.11% within l∞ ≤ 16
(see Table 7 and Fig 5). JPEG and TVM transformations are
slightly effective but only at the cost of accuracy on benign
examples.
Object Detection: RetinaNet [13] collapses in the pres-
ence of adversaries found by NRDM on the MS-COCO
validation set using the VGG-16 [20] feature space. Its
mean average precision (mAP) with 0.5 intersection over
union (IOU) drops from 53.78% to 5.16% under perturba-
7
No Attack FGSM [7] R-FGSM [25] I-FGSM [8] MI-FGSM [6] DIM [26] NRDM
T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5 T-1 T-5
No Defense 95.3 99.8 30.1 56.0 41.5 67.9 69.4 93.0 16.9 42.0 12.9 35.5 5.1 10.2
JPEG (quality=75) 93.9 99.5 30.4 55.4 41.8 67.0 69.7 92.3 18.4 42.0 13.5 33.3 5.4 12.6
JPEG (quality=50) 91.3 99.3 31.0 55.4 40.5 65.3 68.7 91.8 18.1 42.1 13.1 34.4 6.5 12.8
JPEG (quality=20) 86.0 97.6 29.9 53.9 38.0 64.6 69.8 90.9 18.4 42.1 14.1 34.2 8.4 18.7
TVM (weights=30) 93.1 99.4 30.6 56.2 41.7 67.7 73.7 94.5 17.2 42.1 14.9 33.5 9.8 18.5
TVM (weights=10) 88.8 97.6 32.1 57.3 43.6 69.4 73.9 93.4 19.8 45.7 15.8 37.1 24.0 40.5
MF (window=3) 93.2 99.1 24.3 45.5 36.1 62.3 62.8 89.9 16.2 36.8 18.8 42.1 9.9 17.9
Table 9: Inc-v3 accuracy is reported with and without input transformations. Adversarial examples are generated for VGG-16
in white-box setting by FGSM, R-FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM, DIM and NRDM under perturbation budget l∞ ≤ 16 and
then transferred to Inc-v3. T-1 and T-2 represent top-1 and top-5 accuracies, respectively. Best and second best performances
are colorized.
(a) Original (b) Prediction for Original
l∞ ≤ 16
(c) Adversarial (d) Prediction for Adversarial
Figure 5: Segnet-Basic output is shown for different images. (a) is the original image, while (b) shows predictions for the
original image. (c) is the adversary found by NRDM algorithm 1, while (d) shows predictions for the adversarial image. The
perturbation budget is written on the top of adversarial image.
(a) Original
l∞ ≤ 8
(b) Adversarial (c) Original
l∞ ≤ 16
(d) Adversarial
Figure 6: RetinaNet detection results are shown for different images. (a) and (c) show detection for the original images, while
(b) and (d) show detection for adversaries found using NRDM algorithm 1. The perturbation budget is written on the top of
each adversarial image.
tion budget l∞ ≤ 16 (see Table 8 and Fig 6). TVM is rel-
atively more effective compared to other transforms against
the NRDM attack.
7. Conclusion
We propose a novel attack algorithm to demonstrate
how to benefit from generic internal neural representations
of pretrained models (e.g., VGG-16) on ImageNet dataset
to exhibit cross-architecture, cross-dataset and cross-task
transferability. The fact that adversarial examples created
just by maximizing the perceptual distortion can fool mul-
tiple vision systems is both intriguing and puzzling. As
compared to Resnet/Inception, VGG networks generally
perform lower, showing that learned features are not opti-
mal for the classification task. Despite this, the adversaries
found in VGG feature space are the most transferable. This
poses a serious challenge, as an attacker can simply train a
local copy of a VGG style network and use its adversaries
to penetrate any underlying vision system. The General-
izability of our attack algorithm makes it suitable to make
any system robust against adversaries via adversarial train-
ing that benefits from generic off-the-shelf feature represen-
tations of pre-trained classification models.
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